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Abstract Advanced warfare technologies (AWT) create
unprecedented capabilities to control the delivery of mili-
tary force up to the point, some argue, that we are loosing
humanity. But dependence on them generates difficult
moral challenges impacting the decision-making process,
which are only beginning to be addressed. In order to arrive
at an informed opinion about the impact of AWT on de-
cision-making, we need to know more about what AWTs
are and how they operate. We provide a short overview of
the different types of AWTs and discuss the key principles
that underlie Humanitarian Law. We also discuss the im-
pact of physical distance and increased levels of autonomy
on AWT and discuss the challenges posed to moral per-
ception. Before such systems can be deployed, we need to
rest assured that their usage enhances, rather than under-
mines, human decision-making capacities. There are im-
portant choices to be made, and sound design is ‘design for
responsibility’. As a solution, we therefore propose the
partnership architecture that embeds concurrent views of
the world and working agreements, ensuring that operators
use appropriate information in the decision-making
process.
Keywords Sensemaking  Drones  Unmanned systems 
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1 Introduction
Today’s use of drones is no longer limited to surveillance
and reconnaissance tasks only. Drones are also deployed
for the uncontroversial practise of targeted killings.
Typically, a drone is launched in the vicinity of an area of
interest but controlled from a remote control cabinet, often
thousands of miles away. In addition, military organiza-
tions consider equipping drones with high levels of au-
tonomy in order to reduce the degree and amount of
interactions between them and their operators, thereby
lowering the cost of ownership.
One issue within the academic and public discourse over
military actions that has not yet received sufficient atten-
tion concerns the impact of advanced warfare technologies,
like drones and other robots, on the human decision-mak-
ing process. There is a growing concern that ethical values
are violated as a result of high levels of autonomy and
remote control. Scholars from different disciplines ex-
pressed concerns regarding implication on the human de-
cision-making process due to the distance from the
battlefield and increased levels of autonomy, potentially
leading to the abdication of responsibility. The impact on
the decision-making process also raises concerns with re-
gard to the principles of distinction, proportionality and
necessity, all critical elements of International Hu-
manitarian Law.
Some scholars provide arguments in favour of such
advanced technologies in warfare (Altman and Wellman
2009; Strawser 2013). Firstly, for reasons of proportion-
ality, they argue, the use is desirable if other means are
equal. Using unmanned aerial vehicles to carry out, say,
targeted killings leads to less damage and destruction than
a large-scale military operation with boots on the ground.
Secondly, states are under increasing pressure to minimize
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casualties amongst their own service personnel, especially
during operations that are not directly classifiable as self-
defence (Shaw 2005). Indeed, one of the morally and po-
litically attractive features of advanced warfare technolo-
gies is their ability to protect the lives of service personnel
(Strawser 2010).
Needless to say, there have been critical voices. Ig-
natieff seems sceptical about the prospects of ‘virtual
war’, while Robert Sparrow argues that (some types of)
advanced warfare technologies must not be deployed
because they undermine a commitment to moral and legal
responsibility in the armed forces (Sparrow 2007). On top
of the responsibility gap, Noel Sharkey is worried about
so-called killer robots as misuse might arise…’by ex-
tending the range of legally questionable, targeted kill-
ings by security and intelligence forces’ (Sharkey 2010,
p. 369). Furthermore, Royakkers discusses emergence of
the cubicle warrior that gets morally disengaged (Roy-
akkers and van Est 2010). These critical voices are
typically used as reasons not to deploy these advanced
warfare technologies.
However, we stress the importance of this highly rele-
vant debate, and we appreciate the arguments provided by
the critics and proponents. But instead of rejecting ad-
vanced warfare technologies, we use those arguments to
design better systems. This requires an informed opinion
about the impact of advanced warfare technologies on the
human decision-making process. Following value sensitive
design rationales, it is important to (re)design advanced
warfare technologies for ethical values like responsibilities,
proportionality, necessity and discrimination. This will
lead up to advanced warfare technologies that behave more
like a team player or partner. Research in this area is in its
infancy, but is likely to become more prominent. We begin
by giving an overview of the different types of advanced
warfare technologies and discuss some of the challenges
they pose to moral perception The issue of moral percep-
tion, in fact, is crucial for a commitment to responsibility
within the armed forces. We continue by making design
recommendations. There are important choices to be made,
and sound design is always ‘design for responsibility’—or
so we shall argue.
2 Advanced warfare technologies
Since World War II, advanced warfare technologies are an
important aspect in warfare, largely due to the technology
readiness of advanced information and sensor technologies.
It goes without saying that these advanced warfare tech-
nologies, including phased array radars, missile guidance
systems and military robots, are considered an important
asset in military missions. Over time, it has become clear
that such advanced warfare technologies have changed, and
will continue to change, the character of war. Commenting
on NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the academic
and politician Michael Ignatieff speaks of a ‘virtual war’,
where NATO forces, supported by advanced warfare
technologies and more traditional air power, did the
fighting, but only ‘Serbs and Kosovars did the dying’ (Ig-
natieff 2000). NATO’s service personnel, Ignatieff shows,
was removed from the actual combat zones, but carried out
military missions with the help of technology. More re-
cently, French, British and American warships shelled
targets in Libya to assist rebel fighters in the overthrow of
the late Colonel Gaddafi. Like Kosovo, intervening forces
relied heavily on airpower and the latest advanced combat
technologies. Today’s advanced warfare technologies in-
creasingly render ‘boots on the ground’ unnecessary. This
section briefly discusses a number of contemporary tech-
nologies that are already used by military organizations or
that have the potential of being used in the near future
(within 5–10 years).
One category of advanced warfare technologies falls
with those that aid military personnel with the dull, dan-
gerous and dirty work, also known as the 3D’s. The pur-
pose of these robots is to have robots execute those tasks
that are just to boring for humans, those that significantly
reduce the risk associated with the task, or those that take-
over the dirty bits of work, including carrying a heavy load
thereby reducing fatigue. The high-level goal is to have the
human operator remain effective while not experiencing
cognitive underload, extreme boredom or extreme levels of
stress resulting from activities that directly endanger their
life. Examples in this category are robots used for mine or
bomb disposal purposes, deep see missions, urban combat
reconnaissance (e.g. the Dragon Runner), load carrying
robots (e.g. the Alpha Dog) and powered exoskeletons (e.g.
HULC).
The second category of robots concern tele-operated or
unmanned vehicles. The most controversial example in this
category is the unmanned areal vehicle, which is also
known as a drone given the constant, monotone and
humming sound arising from the propeller engines. Instead
of teleoperated or unmanned vehicles, military organiza-
tions prefer to refer to such unmanned systems as remotely
piloted vehicles to emphasize that these vehicles are ac-
tually operated by specialized pilots, although not from the
cockpit but from a different location, which is often
thousands of miles away. Typically, a drone is launched in
the vicinity of an area of interest but controlled from a
remote control cabinet using a satellite relay system. In
today’s military operations, the most frequently deployed
drone is the Preditor or the Reaper drone, both capable of
carrying a payload. Although there are many different
types of drones, it falls outside the scope of this paper to
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list all the different types. Although the deployment of
unmanned areal vehicles is controversial for the practise of
targeted killings and signature strikes, there are considered
a valuable asset for surveillance and reconnaissance tasks.
In addition to the group of unmanned areal vehicles, there
are also a large number of tele-operated vehicles on the
ground (UGV), on the surface of the water (USV) and
under water (UUV).
Many military organizations consider equipping drones
with high levels of autonomy in order to reduce the degree
and amount of interactions between the machine and its
operators, thereby lowering the cost of ownership. For
example, Rolls Royce, GE Aviation systems, QinetiQ, the
UK Ministry of Defence and BEA systems are developing
the Tanaris drone, named after the Celtic God of thunder.
Among other ambitious characteristics, the Tanaris uses a
set of stealth technologies to reduce radar reflections and
emissions and has the capability to fly intercontinental
missions. But, and this is important in the light of this
paper, the Tanaris can act semi-autonomous. The website
of BEA Systems offers a leaflet describing a future field
test where the Tanaris would search an area of interest
using a pre-programmed flight path to locate and identify a
target (BEASystems 2011). Once identified, Tanaris seeks
acknowledgement with mission control to neutralize the
target. This description would fit in a category where the
human would still be ‘on the loop’, where Tanaris would be
flying parts of the mission without human input. On the
other hand, the X47B, developed by Northrop–Grumman,
has shown capabilities to take-off and land without human
intervention on sailing aircraft carriers. Also, the X47B has
capabilities available to refuel without human
interventions.
Clearly, operational unmanned and tele-operated vehi-
cles are, from a technology perspective, on the path of
higher levels of autonomy, and it seems a matter of time,
notwithstanding the effective campaign against the ‘Killer
Robot’ (Human Rights Watch 2012) that led the United
Nations to express a moratorium on autonomous systems
(Heyns 2013a), that at least parts of the missions will be
done autonomously. However, in order to have those sys-
tems be bound by the Laws of Armed Conflict (LoAC) and
other moral principles, a discussion is necessary between
military organization, human rights groups and LoAC
representatives to link different contexts with acceptable
levels of autonomy, which go beyond ‘Killer Robots’ uti-
lized definition of autonomous systems that ‘once activat-
ed, would select and engage targets without human
intervention’. Clearly, such a message lacks context.
Context helps to differentiate between (in)appropriate use
of drones in Yemen and (in)appropriate use of autonomous
systems aboard a navy vessels the context of a defensive
action.
The third category relates to systems that defend. The
defensive systems category differentiates from the other
two in that both military organizations and human rights
groups accept that such systems can work in a full au-
tonomous mode, and some are actually working in full
autonomous mode, also when engaging. The main goal of
such defensive systems is to act quickly to incoming threats
thereby minimizing the risks of direct impact or fallout of
debris. Acting quickly to incoming threats is not only de-
pendent on a proper identification and classification of the
incoming threat, but also on the effective ranges (i.e.
weapons envelops) of the counter-measure weapons.
Typically, reaction times are short. Imagine being the chief
commander aboard a modern navy frigate, alike the Dutch
Air Defense and Command Frigate, the Arleigh Burke
class or the Type 45 guided missile destroyers. Using its
ultramodern sensor suite, several anti-ship missiles can be
detected around the horizon at roughly 30 km (the horizon
is dependent on the earth curvature and height of the ob-
server). Typically, an anti-missile flies just below the speed
of sound, say 300 m/s. This gives thus 100 s before impact
and clearly, countermeasures need to be deployed earlier.
Once an anti-ship missile is detected, a layered approach is
applied starting with electronic countermeasure and de-
coys, followed by attempts to shoot down the anti-ship
missile by short-range missiles (e.g. the Sea Sparrow or
Rolling Airframe Missile). The last resorts are close-in-
weapons, such as the Phalanx or the Dutch Goalkeeper
system. Many navies train their officers to respond effec-
tively to such short response times. Only when the last
resort is left, being the close-in-weapons, full autonomy is
accepted as those systems outperform human operators in
classifying, identifying and neutralizing hostile military
objects. In particular, when decisions about the delivery of
force are made under pressure due to very short reaction
times, having a human operator in the loop may unneces-
sarily delay the delivery of defensive force.
In addition to naval defensive systems, we also want to
discuss the Iron Dome system, which is a defence system
capable to detect rockets at 4–70 km which trajectory takes
those rockets to populated Israeli territory. The Israeli Iron
Dome System can itself make decisions about targeting
hostile missiles, though, currently, the decision (launch of a
counterattack) has to be approved by a human operator.
Although the typical rocket shelled isn’t flying around the
speed of sound giving the human operator significantly
more time to respond the incoming threats, the use-case is
that the number of incoming rockets will be higher com-
pared to navy defensive systems that typically deal with
one or two at a time.
Reduced interaction and short response time are not the
only arguments in favour of higher levels of autonomy in
defensive systems. Moreover, so is argued, those defensive
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systems typically operate in restricted environments, such
as demilitarized zones. South Korea, for example, deploys
the Surveillance and Guard Robot in the demilitarized zone
between South and North Korea. The robot is capable of
tracking multiple moving targets using infrared and visible
light cameras, and is under the control of a human operator.
But the robot has the capability to identify and shoot targets
automatically from over two miles (3.2 km) away. More-
over, the robot is equipped with communication equipment
such that passwords can be exchanged with human troops.
If the person gives the wrong password, the robot has the
capability to fire at the target using rubber bullets or a
swivel-mounted gun.
3 International humanitarian law: three principles
Instead of the pacifist view of world peace, International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) acknowledges that wars are part
of society and defines Laws of Armed Conflict (LoAC)
from a humanitarian perspective. In other words, IHL at-
tempts to balance the human requirements (i.e. right to life)
with the necessities of war, and as such works towards the
reduction of human suffering in and during wars. Indi-
vidual moral and legal responsibility plays, since the
Nuremberg Trials against Nazi war criminals, an important
role in the LoAC and IHL. Prior to the Nuremberg trials,
soldiers, in order to be exculpated from wrongdoing, could
cite the so-called Superior Orders Defence, which required
them only to prove that the orders they carried out were
duly authorized. However, the Nuremberg Trials estab-
lished the so-called Nuremberg Defence. In addition to
showing that an order had been duly authorized within the
command structure of the military, the Nuremberg Defence
sets out two further criteria, the moral perception and moral
choice criteria, which, respectively, require soldiers to
prove that the actions set out by an order were (1) morally
and legally legitimate and (2) unavoidable (May 2005).
After Nuremberg, the common excuse of wrongdoers that
‘they were just following orders’ is no longer valid. In
summary, the backbone of IHL lies with three principles,
being (A) necessity, (B) discrimination and (C) propor-
tionality. First, necessity requires combat forces to engage
only in those acts necessary to accomplish a legitimate
military objective. Attacks shall be limited strictly to
military objectives such as military bases, while hospitals
and graveyards are not necessary to attack. The destruction
of the Iraqi air defense systems during the Operation Desert
Storm serves as a good example of necessity as this led to a
strategic advantage in air space (air superiority). Secondly,
discrimination, or distinction as it is also referred to, re-
quires discriminating between combatants and non-com-
batants. Examples of non-combatants are civilians and
civilian property but also include prisoners of war and
wounded combatants out of combat. In this respective,
tasks like identification and classification are important.
Third, proportionality prohibits the use of any kind or de-
gree of force that exceeds that needed to accomplish the
military objective. Proportionality is thus a balancing act
between the military advantage and the harm inflicted and
as such strives to limit collateral damage.
Clearly, those in violation of these three principles may
be held liable for war crimes. The LoAC distinguishes
justice in the conduct (i.e. jus in bello) of war and justice in
the declaration of a war (i.e. jus ad bellum). Individual
soldiers, or combatants, can be hold responsible for justice
in the conduct of war (in bello), whereas state leaders can
be held responsible for unjustly declaring a war. In other
word, while soldiers cannot be held responsible for par-
ticipation in an unjust war that violates the criteria of jus ad
bellum, they can be held responsible for violations of jus in
bello. Or as Michael Walzer (Walzer 2006) puts it, a sol-
dier is on its own for any crimes committed during war.
4 Effect of advance warfare technologies
There is much debate between leading experts of IHL
whether today‘s deployment of drones is lawful or not
(Heyns 2013b; O’Connell 2010). The complexity of the
debate on drones is exacerbated due to the advances in
autonomous drones and its related campaign against the
killer robots (Human Rights Watch 2012). It is important to
distinguish between effects due to physical distance and
effects resulting from higher levels of autonomy. Regard-
ing the first, physical distance, it is important to understand
the effect of physical distance on moral perception: human
operators see the battlefield by means of mediating tech-
nologies. And with regard to increased autonomy, there is a
growing concern that ethical values are violated (Matthias
2004; Sparrow 2007; Human Rights Watch 2012), up to the
point that we are loosing humanity. It can thus be con-
cluded that both physical distance and increased levels of
autonomy changes how information is perceived and
therefore affects moral perception. Prior to discussion
moral perception, the physical distance and autonomy are
discussed in the following two subsections.
4.1 Physical distance to the battlefield
Today, tele-operated, unmanned or remotely piloted vehi-
cles are considered examples of technologies that enlarge
the physical distance between the battlefield and the human
operators, up to the point that operators are morally dis-
engaged (Royakkers and van Est 2010). However, the
discussion regarding technologies that enlarge the distance
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to and from the battlefield is much older. Since the intro-
duction of artillery guns, philosophers and ethicists have
debated the effect of technology on distance to and from
the battlefield. Clearly, the larger physical distance to the
battlefield has benefits as well as downsides. First and
foremost, the enlarged distance to the battlefield sig-
nificantly reduces the possibility of death or serious injury
amongst service personnel. Secondly, given that they do
not face an immediate threat to their safety, the stress
soldiers experience in combat is diminished. Stress affects
decision-making because it influences how human beings
interpret their environment and frame certain issues. To
illustrate the point, consider the infamous My Lai massacre
that occurred during the Vietnam War. Fearing that the
inhabitants of the hamlet of My Lai were Vietcong guer-
rillas posing as civilians, US soldiers experienced high
levels of stress and, as a result framed any information in
favour of their fear thereby failing to apply the dis-
crimination criterion accurately. This led to one of the
worst massacres in post-war history. A decrease in stress,
then, might lead to greater awareness as well as more ac-
curate interpretations of morally relevant facts in a combat
situation. Following these arguments, the effects of ad-
vanced warfare technologies on decision-making seem
more positive, rather than negative. That said, the reduction
in stress can also have negative effects. While it is correct
that too much stress diminishes human decision-making
capacities, stress can have positive effects on an operator’s
alertness. It has, for example, been demonstrated that un-
der-load conditions negatively impact decision-making and
performance (Endsley and Kiris 1995).
Moreover, the category of tele-operated drones has two
characteristics that are, compared to the piloted jet fighters
or targeting systems, novel. First, drones have increased
surveillance capabilities due a rich sensor suite. Such a
modern sensor suite entails not only more sensors (com-
pared to traditional targeting systems and jet fighters) but
also better quality sensors. Secondly, today’s drones have a
larger surveillance capacity due to increased flying time
compared to jet fighters or helicopters. Both characteristics
lead, at least theoretically, to reduced collateral damage
(due to improved situational assessment allowing to time
any attack such that the expected collateral damage is
least).
There are also a number of downsides reported, espe-
cially in the context of drones. First, drones operators have
an increased risk of post-traumatic stress as it is has been
reported that drone pilots bond with objects with the area of
interest (Abe´ 2012). Secondly, soldiers are directly re-
moved from the horrors of war, and there is the risk that
operators see the enemy not as humans but as blips on a
screen. This introduces the very real danger of losing the
deterrent that such horrors provide. This is, by some,
referred to as the game mentality or moral disengagement
of drone pilots (Royakkers and van Est 2010; Sharkey
2010). Third, it is worried that operators become trigger
happy with remote controlled armaments, situated as they
are in complete safety, distant from the conflict zone (cf.
incorrect judgement of necessity principle). And fourth, the
claim by many states that drones are more precise is de-
bated by many human rights organizations (International
Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic 2012).
4.2 Increased autonomy/levels of autonomy
or automation
Many military organizations consider equipping drones
with high levels of autonomy in order to reduce the degree
and amount of interactions between the machine and its
operators, thereby lowering the operational cost. However,
there is growing concern that, as a result from these high
levels of autonomy, ethical values are under pressure
(Cummings 2003; Royakkers and van Est 2010; Sharkey
2010) up to the point that one or more moral values cross a
critical threshold. For example, placing the human operator
outside of the decision-making loop, Human Right Watch
(2012) argues, opens up a responsibility gap—that is, an
ambiguity with respect to whom should be hold responsible
for actions in case of misdoing (Matthias 2004; Sparrow
2007). Is it the robot, is it the programmer or is it the army?
But we believe that the discussion on the responsibility
gap is subtler. Consequently, we discuss two items. First,
even when a drone operates a mission in full autonomous
mode—that is that the drone achieves a military objective
without the human input or control—someone within the
chain of command has made the decision to deploy the
autonomous drone for the particular operation and thereby
has responsibility. Second, between full autonomous
drones and tele-operated drones lies an opportunity space
of interaction modes, which are (in the discipline of human
factors) known as levels of automation. Moreover, the
notion of autonomy seems to be used differently across
disciplines, leading to ambiguity what it means to be au-
tonomous. Philosophers define moral autonomy as a ca-
pability to (A) pursue the concept of good life (cf. express
free will) and (B) develop desires about our desires (cf.
second-order desires). The latter allows humans to distance
ourselves from our initial believes and critically reflect
upon them. By contrast, the discipline of cognitive engi-
neering and human factors interprets autonomy in the
context of human machine interaction, which we will refer
to as operational autonomy. Bradshaw et al. (2004) claim
that autonomy has two senses, namely self-sufficiency and
self-directedness. The first, self-sufficiency, relates to the
set of actions that are possible with or without the help of
another actor, whereas the second, self-directedness, relates
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to the set of actions that are permitted and obliged. Low
self-directedness indicates that, although potentially ca-
pable of performing the task, the agent is not permitted to
do so, whereas high self-directedness indicates that the
agent has authority over its own actions, though it does not
necessarily imply sufficient competence. Ron Arkin prefers
to talk about constraints instead of permitted and obliged
actions as the laws of armed conflict constrains the de-
ployment of force rather than obliged the use of force
(Arkin 2009). For instance, Rules of Engagement provide
explicit criteria for the use of force as well as for the uti-
lization of certain components of weapons systems. A pilot
of a fighter jet might be constrained to use its fire radar
sensor to lock on enemy or suspect air tracks. The reason
for this prohibition is that opposing forces could interpret
this as a hostile intention unnecessary risking use of force
and life. Likewise, a drone might be restricted in its use of
specific cameras due to privacy regulations.
The self-sufficiency axis of autonomy matches nicely
with the level of automation taxonomies proposed in the
field of human factors. Various studies have been con-
ducted that provide indications on the level of control that
can be allocated towards a human or a machine. These
studies aim to find the sweet spot between full autonomy
and manual operations given the use of the technology in
the context of deployment. Such intermediate levels, often
denoted as mixed initiative, shared control or adaptive/
adaptable automation, are seen as the most promising area
for improved efficiency in interactive systems. Prior to
such intermediate levels, Fitts stated that that humans and
computers have different capabilities by composing a list
of general task abilities summarizing where ‘‘Men-Are-
Better-At’’ and where ‘‘Machines-Are-Better-At’’. The so-
called Fitts’ list (1951) helped designers at that time to
allocate functions or tasks to either a human or a machine.
However, since Fitts a number of taxonomies are proposed
which can, roughly, be summarized as an evaluation of
three generations. The first generation is based upon the
seminal work of Sheridan and Verplank (1978), who were
among the first to acknowledge that automation is not an
‘all or nothing’ fashion (thus contrasting Fitts’ assump-
tion). Sheridan and Verplank defined 10 levels of au-
tomation that differentiate in the actions by the machine
and the information offered (by the machine) to the human.
The second generation is based upon the work of Para-
suraman et al. (2000). In this model, information process-
ing is divided into four stages alike how a human processes
information. The model claims that all of these stages
should be automated at a different level of automation
based on primary (e.g. human performance) and secondary
(e.g. automation reliability) criteria. The third generation
builds upon the four-stage model of Parasuraman, Sheridan
and Wickens but addresses the question how to divide the
work within each of the four stages (Arciszewski et al.
2009). The model recognizes only five different levels of
automation that are clearly differentiated by (A) whether
the machine or the human engages in action and
(B) whether the machine actively updates the human.
Furthermore, the model of Arciszewski and de Greef fo-
cuses on the central domain objects and relevant attributes
and leads to a fine-grained division of labour between the
human and machine with regard to the task. Working
agreements, which allow making explicit which tasks and
objects are in control of the human or the machine, fa-
cilitates such a fine-grained division of labour. Consider, as
an example, a human who is responsible for identifying
track objects (e.g. airplanes, vessels) in an area of interest.
While some objects are unambiguous to identify (i.e. a
radar installation) given the characteristics of the object,
others lack such clear characteristics, increasing the am-
biguity in terms of identification. Using working agree-
ments, the operator, for instance, may delegate the task of
identifying the unambiguous objects to the machine, while
remaining in control of the more cognitive demanding
ambiguous objects.
Depending on the interface design, increased levels of
automaton affects how information is offered to the human.
On the one hand, an operationally autonomous machine
may process and filter large amounts of information before
passing on selected information to an operator. On the
other hand, such operational autonomous machines might
supply operators with too much information. There is a
whole field of interface design challenged by the balance
between filtering information and supplying all information
(cf. Vicente and Rasmussen 1992). Keep in mind that the
problem is worsened due to the fact that airborne drones
can have many sensors and can remain in the air for long
periods of time. Processing the amount of information they
provide may be difficult for a single operator. In both
cases—the undersupply and oversupply of information—it
becomes difficult for operators to filter out morally relevant
facts, hereafter discussed as moral perception.
5 Moral perception affected and some requirements
The concept of moral perception refers to the knowledge of
the morally relevant facts in a particular situation. Since
Nuremberg, in order to be exculpated from wrongdoing, an
individual has to prove that he could not have acquired
knowledge of the morally relevant facts. They must prove
that, based on the information they had at the time, they
thought an order was legitimate. Knowledge of morally
relevant facts enables soldiers to apply the key principles of
discrimination, necessity and proportionality in order to
assess an order.
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However, in light of the rise of advanced warfare
technologies, the way in which soldiers acquire knowledge
of relevant moral facts is being transformed. Depending on
the context, it might be more difficult to hold operators
culpable for, say, applying force to a target. One potential
reason for this is that in case force is applied to the wrong
target, operators could argue that due to the restrictions
imposed by the technology, they did not have full
situational awareness and should therefore be exculpated
from any wrongdoing. As a result, the deployment of NCTs
may undermine a commitment to individual responsibility.
However, following the design practise of value sensitive
design (De Greef et al. 2013; Friedman et al. 2003), we
believe that design for responsibility is the way forward,
also in the use-case of increased levels of autonomy.
This leads to two immediate requirements. Firstly and
from a more technologically oriented perspective, engi-
neers designing military equipment must be sensitive to
how different types of technology impact on the moral
perception of their operators. That is to say, they must take
into account how psychological factors impact information
processing and shape the perception of morally relevant
facts. Secondly and from a more legally and normatively
oriented perspective, advanced warfare technologies must
be designed in order to minimize any distortions or un-
necessary restrictions of their operators’ moral perception.
Overall, sound design must always be design that enhances,
rather than undermines, the preconditions for individual
responsibility. Ensuring this is, in our view, one of the
central moral obligations of engineers and designers. In the
next part of this paper, we discuss the partnership approach
and provide a soft architecture that explains the commit-
ment to responsibility.
6 Partnerships and moral preception
How can we ensure that individuals perceive the relevant
facts in a give situation? One position holds that we can’t.
In fact, it contends that if individuals are unreliable deci-
sion-makers due to stress factors and human information
processing limitations, it might be a good idea to take them
out of any decision-making loop altogether. In this case,
machines are made fully operationally autonomous. This
solution is proposed by the US roboticist Ronald Arkin
(2009). Although Arkin expresses reasonable worries,
taking the human completely out of the loop leads to the
underutilization of human experiences and capabilities. It
remains a fact that specific humans capabilities are, at the
time of writing, hard to replicate by artificial intelligence.
While, for example, computers are really strong in
executing many calculations on large datasets consistently,
they lack creativity or a capability to recognize patterns
that humans recognize quite easily. To do so, humans use a
variety of psychological tools such as the knowledge-based
reasoning mechanism (Rasmussen 1986). The knowledge-
based reasoning mechanism allows humans to cope with
novel and unexpected situations by using basic funda-
mental knowledge (e.g. principles, physical laws) that
governs the specific domain. Today’s artificial intelligence
technologies fail to model precisely the set of tools that
allow being creative and recognize patterns. It is, for in-
stance, difficult to see how a contemporary machine could
interpret complex behaviour characterizing hostile ac-
tivities. However, a computer is at times capable to rec-
ognize less complex but consistent patterns. Up to know,
many claim that a computer is incapable to distinguishing a
combatant from non-combatant merely because human
behaviour is complex. However, classifying particular ob-
jects (by combining databases or recognizing particular
shapes) would typically be something that machines could
outperform humans. So, while Arkin is right to point out
that humans are bad interpreting complex information un-
der stressful conditions, machines presently lack the rea-
soning capacities that allow interpreting complex
behavioural patterns to the same extend humans without
stress would interpret this.
Faced with this problem, it is a commonsensical re-
sponse, we think, to try and ‘team up’ humans and artificial
agents, into a partnership (cf. Klein et al. 2004). The
partnership approach follows the joint cognitive systems
(Hollnagel and Woods 2005) paradigm shift from au-
tomation extending human capabilities to automation
partnering with the human. The artificial agent partners
with the human and as such collaborates in a symbiotic
fashion to achieve the best performance while operating
within safety boundaries. Stated differently, it stresses that
neither the machine nor the human is able to solve prob-
lems individually, but that both are partners in solving
problems effectively and efficiently. Alike human part-
nerships, explicit agreements are made and mutual re-
ciprocity exists between the partners meaning that you
need each other to achieve goals and engage together in
tasks and activities. Some scholars regard artificial agents
in partnership as members of a human–machine team (cf.
Salas et al. 2008, p. 544) or e-partners. The latter are
proposed in various domains such as space missions
(Neerincx and Grant 2010), self-health care services
(Blanson Henkemans 2009) or navy operations (de Greef
2012).
Within the joint cognitive systems paradigm, the col-
laboration between the human and the machine centralizes
around the joint activity of these actors and their joint
performance (see Fig. 1, left). The concept of joint activity
is defined as an activity ‘‘that is carried out by an ensemble
of people acting in coordination with each other’’ (Clark
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1996, p. 4). While Clark studied human teams, a shift from
human teams to human–machine teams is easily facilitated.
Like humans are goal driven and require activities to
achieve those goals, ensembles have a joint goal and re-
quire joint activities in order to accomplish these goals.
Joint activity leads to joint goal accomplishment and is
measurable as joint performance.
The right side of Fig. 1 presents the architecture for the
partnership paradigm and reveals two distinctive features.
First, instead of letting an activity be performed by either
the human, the machine or a combination of both, a
mechanism is put forward for whereby both parties do their
job concurrently. In this way, each actor arrives at an own
interpretation of the world thereby constructing a human
representation of the world and a machine representation of
the world at the same time. Each can deposit the infor-
mation pertaining to their view of the world in their re-
spective ‘storage space’, where the results of their
respective computational and cognitive efforts can be
written to. Having these two distinct views on the world is
akin to two people coming to different conclusions based
on the same set of (non-conclusive) data. The machine may
be viewed as a team member with a limited but scrupu-
lously objective view of the world.
It is thus assumed that the machine is to some extend
capable of deriving its own interpretation of the situation
and has reasoning capability. Both views can be compared
for differences and argumentations. One important aspect
of this concept is the fact that the machine always calcu-
lates (cf. reasons) its view, independent of whether the user
is dealing with the same or not.
Secondly, working agreements are explicit contracts
between the human and the machine about the division of
work (Arciszewski et al. 2009; Miller and Parasuraman
2007; Parasuraman and Miller 2004). Having working
agreements minimizes the automation-human coordination
asymmetry (Woods et al. 2004) because working agree-
ments define an a priori explicit contract what and what not
to delegated to the automation. Working agreements can
reflect easily the opinions of the system designers and users
on the proficiency of the software and can also serve
establishing trust in the workings of the machine by start-
ing at fairly low levels of automation. They can also mirror
thoughts on how much work is ultimately delegated to the
machine under the political and strategic constraints of the
mission. The considerations that are taken into account
when drafting these working agreements are the same as
the secondary evaluation criteria brought to the fore by
Parasuraman et al. (2000): reliability and the costs of
actions.
The concept of partnerships and working agreements
was tested and evaluated in a naval military context (see de
Greef et al. 2010). The eight navy officers who participated
in the study highly appreciated the division of labour be-
tween human and machines introduced by the working
agreement, especially when decisions had to be made under
pressure. Some navy officers claimed that they didn’t fully
agree with the machine but that they accepted, understood
and respected the interpretation of the machine. The offi-
cers liked the working agreements and were relieved that
they could focus on the more demanding tasks while
having the machine carry out relatively easy tasks.
In the light of these findings, the effect of the proposed
partnership architecture on moral perception is potentially
positive. Firstly, the partnership approach increases effi-
ciency via a user-inspired division of labour, lowering the
stress experienced by those operating them. Importantly,
the operator remains involved in the decision-making
process, especially for those tasks and objects that are
deemed important and cognitive demanding. Secondly, the
partnership proposal introduces an interesting dynamic
between human operators and their machines. Just as,
during ordinary teamwork, human team partners may de-
velop different perspectives on a situation, machines and
humans may develop different perspectives on a situation.
This can be taken to our advantage. Operators can use the
Fig. 1 Left: a human and machine collaborate on joint activities leading to a joint performance. The joint activities accomplish a joint goal.
Right: the proposed architecture for the partnership paradigm
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perspective provided by their machine to check whether
they are missing morally relevant facts. The machine may
even flag up aspects of a situation that the operator might
have otherwise overlooked. This safety mechanism chal-
lenges operators to think critically about actions and how
these fit within the moral and legal framework.
If these points are sound, the proposed partnership ar-
chitecture can protect a commitment to responsibility
within the armed forces. First, operators will be responsible
for the terms of their working agreements with their ma-
chine. This raises issues about foresight, negligence and so
on that we cannot tackle here. For now, it suffices to note
that the operator remains firmly control of his machine—
even if there is a physical distance between them or that the
machines operates at increased levels of automation. Se-
condly, working agreements ensure that operators receive
the morally relevant facts needed to make decisions that
comply with IHL, as well as key moral principles.
7 Conclusion
We started by noting that some commentators have argued
in favour of the deployment of advanced warfare tech-
nologies during combat. Indeed, there are some benefits
associated with such advanced technologies. But the
downsides posed by these systems must not be neglected
either. Before advanced warfare technologies can be de-
ployed, we need to rest assured that their usage is safe and
that they enhance, rather than undermine, human decision-
making capacities and a commitment to responsibility.
This is important in any type of armed conflict. During
military missions, the operational requirements upon ad-
vanced warfare technologies and those who operate them
are high. Operators and their superiors need reliable in-
formation about the complex environment they operate in,
especially when they are not directly present.
Following value sensitive design rationales, it is im-
portant to (re)design advance warfare technologies for a
commitment to responsibility and for that, it is important to
discuss ethical values like proportionality, necessity and
discrimination. We therefore propose the partnership ar-
chitecture that embeds concurrent views of the world and
we discuss working agreements. Both ensure that operators
use appropriate information in the decision-making pro-
cess. There are important choices to be made, and sound
design is ‘design for responsibility’. The partnership ap-
proach is a promising way forward, especially in the light
of a commitment to responsibility and when compared to
proposals for fully operationally autonomous machines.
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